There have been worse Navy games than Saturday's 17-6 loss to Air Force. You don't even have to go that far back to find them. However, I doubt there have been any more frustrating.

Navy was unable to do anything at all offensively against the Falcons. One might be accused of hyperbole when saying something like that, but not today. Through three quarters, the Mids had mustered only 11 total yards. They had one first down. Only in the fourth quarter, when Air Force backed off defensively to prevent the deep ball, was Navy able to string a drive together with some short dump-off passes. And even that was preceded by two other drives that ended with interceptions. An offense that had been boom-or-bust all season was woefully short on booms.

If that were all there was to it, this would have been merely a bad game. What made it frustrating was that it wouldn't have taken much for Navy to win. Navy's defense was like the equal and opposite reaction to their offense. Air Force is one of the most consistent offenses in the country and entered the game #1 in both rushing offense and third down conversion percentage. The Mids held them to 2.9 yards per carry and 1-13 on third down. The Falcons scored only ten points despite having an average starting field position at their 39-yard line. They had three drives that began in Navy territory and came away with zero points on those drives. As bad as things were on offense, Navy was in this game until the very end because the defense was that good.

This wasn't entirely surprising. In a broad sense, the game went how I think we all expected it to. At least, you should have expected it. In the preview, we talked about how consistency would be hard to come by. Navy's offense has been erratic all season, and that wasn't going to change against the one team on the schedule that defends them the best every year. It wasn't sustained drives that were going to win this game. It was figuring out how to land that one haymaker.

While the nature of the game was predictable, it was the extent of Navy's futility that was so remarkable. Even if the Mids weren't going to have 12-play scoring drives, one would expect them to maybe pick up a first down here and there to flip the field occasionally. They couldn't even do that. There were several reasons for this; we'll get into those in a minute. But first, we should get an understanding of what Navy was trying to do.

In the preview, we discussed the dilemma of picking a starting quarterback for this game. Tai Lavatai is a senior who can get the offense in the right play and won't be rattled by the moment, but he isn't much of a threat to run. Braxton Woodson is fast, athletic, and has big-play potential, but he's also a freshman. He's unpolished and prone to freshman mistakes. Ultimately, the coaches went with Woodson, likely because they knew they'd need explosive plays, which made it worth the risks. Lavatai's health may have also played a factor.

A lot of Navy's playcalling revolved around trying to get Woodson free. We saw a lot of rollouts, draw plays, and misdirection designed to either get him in space or to have him improvise. It made sense to highlight Woodson since quarterback runs haven't shown up in too much Navy film lately. None of it worked, although nothing else did, either.

The plan was put into action on the first play. One thing we discussed in the preview was that Navy hadn't used much misdirection this year, but they tried some coming out of the gate. The play was supposed to be a semi-rollout one way with a throw back to a post pattern the other way. The fullback isn't likely to maintain a block against the defensive end, but he has to at least slow him down a little. He did not.

It didn’t work, but the reaction to the play call was sort of silly. Aaron Taylor, my least favorite sports commentator on the planet, referred more than once to how the call was a mistake. He argued that with a rookie quarterback, you want to ease him into the game with something simple. That’s conventional wisdom. But this series hinges on plays that go against convention. In a game where big plays will make all the difference, you have to take advantage of every opportunity to catch the defense off guard. In fact, it’s very similar to what Air Force did on the third play of last year’s game.

First down has been a strength for Navy this year. The Mids entered the game ranked 10th in the country in average yards per first down play. Where they’ve struggled is on second and third down after defenses have had a chance to adjust. They are one of the top teams in the nation in scoring drives of 1:00 or less precisely because they strike early. This was hardly playcalling malpractice. Some people are a little too desperate for a hot take.

Anyway, moving on.

On the next play, the Mids ran a pin-and-pull with the quarterback, something that had modest success against USF. This time, it didn’t go anywhere. Woodson’s first steps were backward, which ran him into the blitzing OLB. It probably wouldn’t have gone anywhere anyway, though, since the middle linebacker was left unblocked. Both the pulling lineman and wide receiver blocked the same player.

On the next drive, the Mids tried a rollout draw. This is one of my favorite plays of the Johnson era— Lamar Owens used to be a pro at it— but it fell out of favor in recent years for whatever reason. I’m pretty sure I saw it once earlier this season, but only once. It made sense that it was in the game plan against an aggressive team like Air Force, but here it wasn’t executed very well. The defensive tackle isn’t blocked long enough for the play to develop.

The Mids tried some more misdirection on their next drive, using the counter trey for the first time this season:

Navy finally picked up a first down on their next drive. With the misdirection plays not working, they tried getting the ball outside, first with the jet sweep.

They followed that up with a swing pass, using the T-back in the backfield running the other way to keep inside defenders honest. After that, they tried the same look but ran a pop pass to the opposite side, hoping to draw the safety away to leave a one-on-one matchup between the receiver and cornerback. If it was a perfect throw, the play might have had a chance. However, the ball was overthrown.

Navy started the next drive with a look we haven’t seen all season. They lined up in what was called the “double flex” in the old offense. I’m not sure what it’s called in the new offense, but fans have called it the “tight” formation, when both wide receivers are lined up close to the tackles. However, instead of the fullback being lined up in the backfield, he’s lined up like a third slotback. He motions into the backfield, but at tailback depth, not fullback depth. The Mids tried to run an inside zone with it, but they couldn’t block anyone. They had a little more success running a toss play with it.

They went back to a swing pass on the next play, but the wide receiver couldn’t get leverage on the outside linebacker who followed the motion.

Navy then tried a jet sweep from under center, but the defense recognized the linemen kicking outside and read the play.

In the second half, the Mids opened by running play action off of the new look with the fullback in motion. Woodson picked up a few yards on a scramble. That was followed up with something that sort of looked like an RPO, but wasn’t. The entire right side of the formation started run blocking, while one receiver on the left side went out into a pattern. The Mids were quite rightfully flagged for an illegal man downfield. There were a few. I don’t know if this was just a poorly-executed play or if the coaches were daring the referees to throw a flag.

On the next drive, the Mids tried running the old rollout draw again, but this time from the new formation. When that didn’t work, they tried play action, but Woodson was running for cover right after the snap.

Next, Navy tried to run play action off of a jet sweep look, but the backside defenders weren’t fooled. On the next play, Woodson was sacked again as the line couldn’t protect him against a four-man rush.

That would be the last series for Woodson. On the first drive of the fourth quarter, he was replaced by Lavatai. After a quarterback sweep that went for no gain, Lavatai completed a short hook for nine yards. Both cornerbacks dropped for the deep ball, giving the receivers cushion for a quick throw.

That set up a quarterback sneak that picked up a first down. Next, the Mids went back to motioning the fullback into the backfield. They ran another iso play, using the slotback as the lead blocker. It didn’t work in the first half, and it wouldn’t have worked here either if Alex Tecza didn’t spin his way out of a tackle. It took two more plays to get the next three yards, but Navy got another first down. After that, though, the drive fizzled. They made another attempt at the counter trey, which was blown up. They then ran an inverted veer, but there weren’t enough blockers on the perimeter after the CB wasn’t fooled by the WR cutting inside to block.

Navy’s next two drives both ended in interceptions. On the first, Lavatai had Tecza open underneath, but the ball slipped through his hands and into a defender’s.

You could argue that Lavatai should have used more touch on his throw instead of firing a bullet, but based on Tecza’s reaction on the sideline afterward, it’s clear he felt that he should have caught the ball.

The second interception was just thrown over the receiver’s head and was returned for a touchdown.

On the play before that, Navy had their best scoring opportunity of the game. After Navy had completed a couple passes in the flat earlier, four Air Force defenders jumped the route here. That left Jayden Umbarger all alone running up the right sideline. It was a very similar situation to Air Force’s lone offensive touchdown. But while the Falcons connected with their open receiver, Navy did not.

If that pass is completed, Navy would have scored with four minutes left and one timeout. With the way the defense was playing and Air Force punting into the wind, there was a good chance Navy could have gotten the ball back in good field position with around two minutes left. They were still very much alive in the game. It’s hard to be critical of someone trying to complete a pass while standing in a collapsing pocket, but the harsh reality is that’s what it takes to win a game like this.

You can see that offensive coordinator Grant Chesnut tried just about everything he could. One thing we didn't see was any trick plays, which is a little unusual for a Navy-Air Force game. However, those plays tend to be slow-developing, and the way the offensive line was struggling, it didn’t make sense to have the ball in the backfield for very long. Anything short of trickery, though, was tried. It wasn’t a lack of mixing things up that led to Navy’s performance.

With that, there are a few takeaways from this game, plus other things to keep in mind.

— Don't overreact: Navy fans are great. Mostly. They are annoying as hell when it comes to service academy games. Don't get me wrong, these are rivalry games and the most important ones on the schedule, so it makes perfect sense that more emotion is attached to them. But don't let that emotion cloud your objectivity. These games are always unusual, and you should treat them accordingly.

The 2009 Navy team won ten games with Ricky Dobbs at the helm. The week before the Air Force game, they scored 38 on Western Kentucky. The week afterward, they dropped 63 on Rice. They went on to beat Missouri in the Texas Bowl. The Air Force game, however, was a 16-13 slog.

Navy fans worship Will Worth. His 2016 team beat Notre Dame, beat #6 Houston, scored 183 combined points in consecutive weeks against Tulsa, ECU, and SMU, and played in the AAC championship game. Against Air Force, they rushed for only 57 yards in a 28-14 loss.

No, this year's offense isn't nearly as good as those were. But that's the point. Some of the best Navy offenses have had difficulty against Air Force. The same can be said of the best Air Force offenses against Navy. That's the nature of this game. The problems you already know are there will be amplified. You shouldn't draw too many conclusions from it. Air Force gets a lot of credit for how bad Navy's offense looked on Saturday.

— Getting leverage: In the preview, I talked about Navy's problems getting leverage when blocking on the perimeter. Newberry mentioned those same issues in his Monday Zoom call, and we saw it in some of the clips above. One reason why it was tough to do against Air Force is that the Mids weren't trying to run the ball outside because that's what the defense was giving them. They were trying to run outside because they couldn't block inside. That is not the same thing.

— Offensive line: The offensive line had their worst game of the season on Saturday, and it got worse as the game continued. Again, though, a lot of that is the nature of the game. Air Force has the country's #1 rushing offense, and they didn't look all that great either. They did look better than Navy, though. It's one thing to have difficulty running up the middle, but it's another to be turning guys loose every time you line up in the shotgun. That was the case all too often on Saturday.

It was particularly disappointing to see because the offensive line had looked pretty good up until this point. But maybe it shouldn't have been a surprise. Navy lost Lirion Murtezi for the year a month ago. Trey Cummings was ruled out before the game. Connor McMahon gets hurt in every game but keeps fighting his way back onto the field. Sam Glover separated his shoulder. It reached a point in the second half where the Mids ran out of available tackles before McMahon managed to duct tape his ankle to the bottom of his leg to return to the game. The line is more banged up at the season's midpoint than I can remember.

But is it a self-inflicted wound? Brian Newberry has talked often about how much hitting the team has done in practice; he alluded to it again on Monday. It's unusual to see that much at this point in the season. One of the criticisms of the team in recent years was that it didn't have the same toughness as successful Navy teams of the past. I have no idea if the criticism was valid or not, but Newberry has made sure that whatever else could be said about his team, nobody can say they aren't tough. It's possible these injuries may be the side effects of that approach.

This is pure speculation on my part. Indeed, with Navy's unusually long gaps between games early in the season, it might have made sense for them to have more physical practices to keep their edge. With the injuries mounting, though, I think it's worth asking if that is still the case.

— Why go for two? After Navy scored their only touchdown late in the fourth quarter, Newberry opted for a two-point conversion. This caused a minor uproar in gambling degenerate circles. I have no interest in gambling, so I usually ignore that chatter. However, I saw one tweet claiming there was no reason to go for two there. That is incorrect.

The conventional wisdom in that situation would be for Navy to kick the extra point. That would have put the Mids down by ten points, so they'd need a touchdown and field goal to tie the game. But the object of the game is not to tie; it's to win. If by some miracle the Mids managed to get that touchdown and field goal, you'd want those final miracle points to put the game away, not to take you to overtime. It is easier to gain three yards on one play than it is to play a whole second mini-game in overtime. Maybe that isn't the strategy you'd choose, but it is still perfectly logical.

— "Give it to [Player] more" is not a plan: Alex Tecza made a splash in the Charlotte game with his 62-yard touchdown run that clinched the game for the Mids. He has shown a knack for big plays this season, and is one of only eight players in the country with two or more runs of 60+ yards against FBS competition. Those long runs have helped him maintain a high yards per carry average, and his 8.11 ypc as of last week led the country among players with the minimum number of carries.

In one of the weekly coaches' Zoom calls, Bill Wagner asked if Tecza should get the ball more. When a player is a national leader, it's natural to ask the coaches about how that player is being used. It's a valid question. Contrary to what fans may believe, though, the answer isn't automatically "yes."

When a player has a high average per carry like that, it means he's already being put in positions to succeed. That's especially true in an option offense where the ballcarrier is often not predetermined. That's why "give it to the slots more" was never a valid argument. The slotbacks had a high ypc because they got the ball when they were supposed to. If you forced the ball to them, they wouldn't have a high ypc anymore. You could just as easily make the argument that it's better to not mess with the one thing that has been most successful with the offense this year.

The problem with the offense isn't that Tecza doesn't get the ball enough. The problem is that other players aren't similarly being set up to succeed.

— Quarterbacks: Saving the most annoying topic for last.

While there were far more issues than just the quarterback against Air Force, Braxton Woodson did not have a good game. He wasn't alone, though. I was surprised people seemed to think that Tai Lavatai earned the permanent starting job based on what he did in the fourth quarter:

That tweet came during Lavatai’s first drive of the game— a drive that netted only nine yards. That’s an awfully low bar for being “the guy.”

After the USF game, I wrote this:

Each quarterback has his strengths and weaknesses, and defenses will learn those weaknesses and adjust accordingly. At his media availability yesterday, Coach Chesnut seemed to get a little frustrated with all the quarterback talk, pointing out that he doesn't want to pin everything on the quarterbacks and that it's a team game. As you'll see, changing quarterbacks is not the cause of the offense's problems, so just picking one won't solve those problems. That's not to say that you can't have a preference for whatever reason. Just calibrate your expectations. Putting in your preferred quarterback is not the One True Path that will fix the offense.

Nothing about that statement has changed. At this point, we have seen everything that people have said they wanted. Lavatai has started. Horvath has started. Woodson has started. Some people said they just wanted the coaches to pick a quarterback and stick with him. But when that happened against Air Force, you had other people complaining that the coaches didn’t change quarterbacks soon enough. At some point, people have to realize that there are other positions on the field.

Fans want to argue that Their Guy is the answer at quarterback because that would mean an easy answer exists. But the truth is that there are no easy answers. No quarterback is going to fix the perimeter blocking. No quarterback will make the offensive line healthier. It’s going to take time and reps to fix the offense, but nobody wants to hear about patience after three straight losing seasons.

The quarterbacks are a known quantity. They each have their strengths and weaknesses, and different games or different in-game situations could mean that different quarterbacks are the right guy for the job at that time. Until one of the quarterbacks steps up and claims the job outright— and no, none of them have— there is nothing wrong with QB by committee.