Last week, I talked about how I thought USF was a bad matchup for Navy. I felt that the game had the makings of a shootout, and I just didn't think the Navy offense was ready for that kind of contest. I don't get them all right, but I was pretty spot on this time. The Mids jumped out to a 14-0 lead, but the Bulls overcame their mistakes and pulled away in the second half for a 44-30 win.

One of the things I talked about was how USF's tempo and alignment on offense make it difficult for defenses to disguise their intentions. That's the Navy defense's bread and butter. Against USF, Navy's defensive backs were left with a lot of single coverage, and the Bulls took advantage of it often. USF was always going to score points. The goal for the Navy defense this week wasn't really to shut down USF as much as it was to generate plays that got them off the field and gave the offense a chance to hold serve.

For the most part, Navy's defense did that. USF was 6-16 on third downs and had only 97 rushing yards. The Mids forced three turnovers, sacked Byrum Brown four times, and didn't allow the nation's leading rushing quarterback to make any plays with his legs. While USF came into the game among the leaders in tackles for loss per game, it was Navy that had more (6). USF had five scoring drives. Navy had five scoring drives. Service held.

The problem was in the details. Coach Newberry talks every week about how the margin for error is slim at a place like the Naval Academy, and those margins made all the difference on Saturday. If a wide-open pass isn't overthrown by a few feet, Navy's lone field goal would have been a touchdown. A lack of discipline on special teams led to two points for USF on a bad PAT snap. A roughing the kicker penalty took away a chance at another possession for the offense. There was a missed field goal. A fumbled snap on a quarterback sneak turned a promising Navy drive into seven points the other way. No matter what else happened with the offense-- and it's still a work in progress, don't get me wrong-- if these plays were executed correctly, we have a completely different ballgame. When Newberry says the team is close to a breakthrough, he isn't lying.

That is encouraging and frustrating at the same time. It's encouraging because, for the most part, this isn't about talent. Blake Horvath's overthrow might be a matter of arm talent, but the rest of these problems are about discipline and execution. But that's also what makes it frustrating. Executing these fundamentals used to be Navy's calling card. Instead, the Mids are out there committing eight penalties. When coaches talk about "learning how to win," they're talking about getting stuff like this cleaned up and not shooting themselves in the foot. Navy is a team still learning how to win.

The other thing that could have made a difference, though, is a more dependable performance from the offense. We're seeing a boom-or-bust trend when Navy has the ball. When they execute, the Mids are capable of generating some big plays. They had another long pass play, this time a 68-yard touchdown from Horvath to Eli Heidenreich. They also had six runs of 15+ yards, including four over 20 yards. The problem is that they just don't execute consistently enough. Navy had 240 rushing yards. Those six chunk plays made up more than half of that number. On their other 42 carries, they only averaged 2.7 yards. That led to a seemingly contradictory statistic. The Mids averaged 8.4 yards on first down plays, yet their average distance to gain on third down was 7.1 yards. The Mids went three-and-out five times. While Navy can generate big plays, they aren't doing the kinds of things play after play that keeps the sticks moving.

It should be noted that this was the case regardless of who played quarterback. After the game, my Twitter timeline was flooded with fans demanding that the coaches settle on one QB. There was no consensus, however, on which one. "The offense fell apart after Tai went out," "Horvath's a better runner," and "just start the plebe" were all arguments offered in roughly equal measure. And maybe there is merit to sticking with one quarterback. I don't think there's anything inherently wrong with playing two, but let's say I'm wrong. Would that solve anything on its own? I don't think so.

Each quarterback has his strengths and weaknesses, and defenses will learn those weaknesses and adjust accordingly. At his media availability yesterday, Coach Chesnut seemed to get a little frustrated with all the quarterback talk, pointing out that he doesn't want to pin everything on the quarterbacks and that it's a team game. As you'll see, changing quarterbacks is not the cause of the offense's problems, so just picking one won't solve those problems. That's not to say that you can't have a preference for whatever reason. Just calibrate your expectations. Putting in your preferred quarterback is not the One True Path that will fix the offense.

Anyway, on with the show.

USF's defense spent the majority of the game in an eight-man front, a pretty standard look against option teams. What drove Navy's playcalling for most of the afternoon wasn't the alignment, though. USF has a reputation for being aggressive, and they stayed in character against the Mids. Knowing that the fullback runs through the B gap in a veer scheme, USF had the playside inside linebacker covering that gap, and sometimes running straight for it after the snap. The outside linebacker didn't wait to read the play; he shot straight into the backfield to cover the pitch.

Early on, the Mids tinkered with running the option against this. Since they knew the ILB would be playing inside to take the fullback, they decided to put him in the count as the pitch read. The OLB that would normally be the pitch read would instead be blocked. In theory, with the ILB playing inside, that would be an easy pitch read, and it was. The play went for a decent gain. However, the pitch was awfully close to getting batted down, and nobody was able to block the safety, who made the tackle.

The Mids didn't need to run the option to have success against this look, though. With the OLB running into the backfield and the ILB covering the B gap, Navy just started running the ball through the C gap. Their most successful play, especially early in the game, was just to run a pin and pull with the fullback. If the ILB tried to read the play, the slotback could seal him inside. If the ILB blitzed the B gap, the slotback could load from the ILB to the safety to set up an even bigger gain.

That play set up Navy's first two touchdowns.

If the ILB is running to the B gap, you can run through the C gap, but you can also run through the A gap using the midline option. That's what the Mids tried on the next drive, but it looked like a blown play; the ball went to the right, but it was the backside DT that went unblocked. Then, on the following play, the Mids tried to run an inside handoff to the slotback, but the OLB was unblocked and shot into the backfield, almost taking the handoff himself.

The Mids had a little more success running the midline on their next drive, but when they went back to the pin and pull with the fullback, USF changed their LB stunt. Now it was the DE who shot into the backfield to beat the pulling lineman, while the ILB scraped outside.

With the DE now shooting for the mesh, the Mids ran a double option to pitch off of him. A pulling guard took care of the scraping ILB. After that, the Mids went back to the pin and pull. This time, the pulling guard trapped the DE shooting upfield. With the ILB scraping outside, the fullback ran up the middle instead of through the C gap.

That drive stalled, though. First, a false start penalty knocked the Mids back five yards. After that, Horvath missed a read on the triple option. On the next play, the Mids tried to run a fullback trap, but the outside linebacker went unblocked and made the tackle near the line of scrimmage.

The Mids ran an inverted veer to set up a reasonable fourth-down try, but they were stopped short.

Three plays later, though, Navy got the ball back after Xavier McDonald sacked Brown and forced a fumble that Luke Pirris recovered. The Mids went back to the triple, and this time Horvath made the right read. Just as critical to this play, though, was the read of the fullback. When the DT went left, Alex Tecza went right. The playside ILB was focused on the wrong gap, and Tezca ran right by him.

The Mids would score four plays later, which should have tied the game just before halftime. Instead, USF regained the momentum after a blocked extra point and went into the locker room with a three-point lead.

Nevertheless, Navy's defense came through after halftime, holding USF to a three-and-out after Will Harbour's third-down sack. Amin Hassan's return of the ensuing punt put the Mids in USF territory to start their next possession. The Mids only managed a field goal out of the drive, though.

They picked up a first down on a double option pitch to Brandon Chatman that went for five yards. On the play, you can see how the Mids left the playside ILB unblocked, expecting him to remain keyed on the B gap. However, it's the ILB who ran outside to make the tackle. Later, when facing a third down, the Mids tried to run up the middle to the area the ILB had previously vacated. However, USF changed up their stunts again. The OLB which had been running upfield to take the pitch instead shot inside and made an ankle tackle on Horvath. The DE went into the backfield instead.

On the next drive, the Mids went back to the pin and pull on first down, but the USF DT just made a heads-up play. On second down, the Mids ran the triple. In real-time, it might have appeared as if Horvath missed a read, He didn't, though; you can see who his keys were. Keeping was the correct decision. However, the playside linebacker was supposed to be double-teamed by the playside tackle and wide receiver but ended up going unblocked.

The ensuing third-down pass was completed but was short of the line to gain.

Navy's next drive started off with a decent gain on an option pitch. Once again, the Mids pitched off of the defensive end who had been using a mesh charge. The inside linebacker stayed over the B gap and keyed on the fullback, which allowed Chatman the room to cut upfield.

Later in the series, Horvath ripped off a tremendous option keeper up the right sideline. The Mids motioned toward the field, where they already had a receiver and another slotback. The defense overreacted, which gave the Mids a numbers advantage when they ran to the weak side.

They then tried to run a counter option to get the unblocked safety running the wrong way, but the safety wasn't fooled.

Horvath then fumbled on the ensuing third-down play.

Lavatai then came back in. Facing third down after getting pressured and throwing an incomplete pass on second down, Lavatai had Nathan Kent open underneath. If he delivered a soft pass ahead of Kent and hit him in stride, Kent would not only have picked up the first down, but he would've only had one other man to beat and another receiver blocking in front of him. Instead, Lavatai threw a laser beam that was a little behind Kent.

Even if it was caught, breaking stride like that would've made it difficult to turn the corner to pick up a first down.

On the next drive, the Mids went back to the double option, pitching off of the defensive end.

That was as far as the Mids would advance, though. The Mids then ran a triple option, and in real-time it looked like Lavatai made the wrong read. He didn't, though. You can see the two keys that were left unblocked. It was the safety who came up to make the tackle. You could argue that maybe Lavatai could have stressed the pitch key a little more, but that would've just given the safety more time to get into the backfield and maybe even bat down the pitch. The play was likely doomed either way.

As was the next play, which, to be honest, I don't even know what happened. When all hell breaks loose like that, I suspect it's because the quarterback should've recognized bad blocking angles and checked to run the play the other way. That's just a guess, though. Whatever it was, eek.

The Mids missed the ensuing field goal attempt, which effectively ended the game. They did score on their next drive on the pass to Heidenreich, but they didn't get the ball back after that.

So what are we to make of this? I suppose it's in the eye of the beholder. Most beholders are going to make it all about the quarterbacks no matter what I say, so this whole article is sort of pointless. But really, how much of what we see here is about the quarterback? Not that they were perfect or anything, because they weren't by any stretch. Obviously, the missed passes and fumble were game-changers. But you could put Roger Staubach under center and it won't fix an unblocked safety. The playcalling didn't appreciably change as the quarterbacks switched, either. There may or may not be a right answer at quarterback, but that isn't necessarily the right question to be asking in the first place.

I've also seen some discussion about playcalling, questioning why Navy ran up the middle so much against an eight-man front and why Navy didn't do more in the passing game, particularly the short passing game. The answer to the second part, to me, is sort of obvious; if the defense is playing shallow, why pass it shallow? That's where the defenders are. If anything, I wonder why the Mids didn't throw deep more than they did. When Navy had receivers turned loose, it was simply because they had more receivers than USF had secondary defenders in a 4-4-3. It looked like that was the case most of the afternoon, at least on first down. I suspect that the coaches felt their best shot was to hold onto the ball, which meant they placed a higher priority on staying on schedule than they did on taking a chance on long pass plays.

As for running up the middle, the thing about a defense crowding the line of scrimmage is that it doesn't leave anyone behind on the second or third level if a runner manages to bust through. The defense might be aggressively defending every running lane, but you only have to break through on one of them. You can do that with a double team in a zone scheme, reading defenders in a veer scheme, or by pulling extra blockers where you want to go. That's what happened on most of the Mids' best runs in the game. Again, though, the challenge is consistency.

Hopefully, the Mids will get there soon. Most of the team's goals are still on the table, but the longer it takes to get their act together, the less attainable those goals become.