The Tulane Debrief
Ken Niumatalolo said in the week leading up to the Tulane game that playing them is like playing one of the other service academies. He sure wasn’t kidding. When Navy plays Army and Air Force, the games are usually close, with both teams’ offenses held well below their season averages. That certainly was true for the Midshipmen and the Green Wave, who went a combined 9-29 on third down conversions. Memphis put up almost as many yards on its own against UCLA (560) as the sum of both Navy and Tulane (588).
For those who enjoy the fine art of punting, this game was a Rembrandt.
It wasn’t just the hard-fought nature of the game that gave it the vibe of a service academy clash, either. Tulane’s defense lined up the same way that Air Force does each year against the Mids, with an odd front and aggressive safeties playing man-to-man on the slotbacks. Florida Atlantic also lined up the same way, although some of the tactics that Tulane used were different. They were carried out by better players with better coaching, which made for a much tighter contest.
Schematically, there were three main things that Tulane did for which Navy offensive coordinator Ivin Jasper had to adjust; there was the aggressive run support of the playside safety, the pursuit of the backside safety, and the inside linebackers keying on the fullback while the defensive end squeezed the playside tackle. Let’s take a look at each one.
Navy opened with the midline option, and it immediately became apparent that the Green Wave defense was going to be very aggressive in using the playside safety in run support.
It didn’t help that the playside slotback blocked nobody on that play, which brings us to Navy’s first adjustment: telling the slotback to do his job. Not surprisingly, that seemed to work pretty well:
Another option when there are extra defenders hovering around the line of scrimmage is to bring extra blockers. If the safety is coming up to the first or second level, there is nobody on the third level to stop a ballcarrier that breaks through. Navy did this by running a load option, with the fullback leading the way as a blocker. In this case, while the safety wasn’t actually blocked, he was confused enough to key on the fullback and overrun the play. The result was the same.
Perhaps the most important thing to do with an overly aggressive safety is to throw over his head, which the Mids were able to do on their second drive:
They had a much harder time doing so for the rest of the game, but we’ll get to that in a minute.
The safeties playing man defense meant that one of them was almost always following tail motion. The solution to this is usually to run plays away from the direction of the motion, and that’s what Navy did here. The most successful of these plays was Tyler Carmona’s 79-yard touchdown reception on a crossing route. With both safeties on one side of the field, there wasn’t anyone to stop him once he caught the ball on the other side:
Other attempts at misdirection weren’t as fruitful. When the Mids tried to run the option away from tail motion, the safety wasn’t fooled. This play succeeded only because of Malcolm Perry’s shiftiness:
The safety’s awareness was the product of good coaching and film study. It was a similar result when Navy tried to use twirl motion to get the safety moving the wrong way. You’ll see that on this next play, but also note how the defensive end squeezes the playside tackle.
Squeezing the tackle prevents him from being able to block an inside linebacker, who in this case was keying in on the fullback.
Navy found a few different ways to counter this. The first was running the fullback trap out of the trips formation. Since the defensive end was squeezing anyway, it was easy for the playside tackle to block him. The pulling guard could take care of the linebacker if he was keying on the fullback, and the formation ensured that the backside safety wouldn’t be a factor.
Jasper complimented this play with the trap option:
Later in the game, though, the backside ILB (still keying on the fullback) was able to recognize the play and make the tackle.
When inside linebackers have the fullback as their singular focus, Navy often blocks #1 in the count to get the ball outside, knowing that the linebackers won’t pursue. They did the same against Tulane. Again, with #1 squeezing, it was an easy block for the playside tackle to make.
(You might notice that on the second play of that clip, Navy changed their blocking assignments. The playside slotback blocked the backside safety, who made the tackle on the first play).
To keep the ILBs honest, the Mids still needed to give the ball to the fullbacks once in a while. They did so by running off tackle. While the ILBs focused on the A and B gaps, the fullback ran through the C gap.
As good as Tulane’s defensive scheme was, Navy had counters for all of it. The Mids’ biggest problems came not from a lack of answers, but in executing those answers.
Tulane’s players had a lot to do with that, with the nose guard being a prime example. Against an odd front, it is vital for the center to get movement from the nose guard one way or another, since that’s the fullback’s read on the dive. If the NG goes one way, the fullback runs the other way. Here, you can see the NG hold his ground, which allowed him to be a two-gap player and make the stop:
That’s a play that looks like a bad quarterback read in real time, but wasn’t.
Tulane also did a good job of using their hands to shed blocks.
It should be noted that Navy doesn’t cut block at the second level nearly as much as they used to, aiming for the hip instead. That’s what happened here, and one can’t help but wonder if it’s less effective.
The Mids themselves were the source of some of their problems, too. On this play, Navy ran the quarterback off tackle, with the fullback as a lead blocker. Knowing that the inside linebacker was keying on the fullback and was likely to follow him outside, Navy ran the play out of the heavy formation, bringing a second tackle to the play side to account for the ILB. However, he couldn’t make the block, and Navy was stopped short on third down.
A similar thing occurred when the Mids tried to run the midline. The linebacker ran right past the guard that was supposed to block him:
Perhaps the most maddening part of the whole afternoon for Navy fans was the offense’s inability to complete a pass. Zach Abey was only 4-12 through the air, and while two of those completions were big plays, there could have been so much more.
When a defensive back is playing aggressive run support, the wheel-post combination is a staple of the Navy offense. The routes look like blocking assignments at first, and by the time the DB realizes that it’s a pass play, it’s too late. Usually, you have one defensive back left to cover two receivers. The Mids tried to run this play multiple times against Tulane, but could never connect.
The first time, Abey barely overthrew Darryl Bonner on the wheel route, although in fairness I think Bonner would have caught the ball had he stayed on his feet. He appeared to jump to early for the ball:
They tried to run the play again, but this time, Malcolm Perry ran a bad route. Instead of a wheel route, he ran a corner route. He would have been wide open if he ran a wheel route, but because he ran straight upfield instead of curling toward the sideline, the backside safety was able to get an angle and run back in coverage.
Navy tried to run a wheel-post variant again later in the game, only this time they had the wide receiver run a rub route to keep the backside safety from covering the slot in the wheel. The cornerback actually made a heads-up play to peel off the WR and cover the wheel, but the Mids still might have completed the pass if Abey didn’t put so much air under the ball.
And that’s just what happened when the pass protection was decent, which wasn’t always the case. Navy tried to run another variation of the wheel-post out of the heavy formation, with the eligible tackle/WR running the post, and the fullback on the wheel. Once again, the wheel was wide open, but the center couldn’t slide over to block the blitzing inside linebacker.
Players didn’t always seem clear on their assignments, either. Here, the outside linebacker is left unblocked and given a clean shot at Abey. Perry, who would be the obvious choice to make that block, runs clear over to the other side of the field and blocks nobody. If that’s the way the play was designed, then it’s strange at best. More likely, either Perry was correct, and it should have been a sprintout (probably not, given the play action), or Perry was confused and should have stayed home to pick up the OLB.
This is two weeks in a row that we’ve seen defenses line up like Air Force. We’re probably going to see it a lot this season. Navy needs to be able to make these open plays if they expect to win those games.
On the other hand, the performance of the defense is going to give them a chance to win these games, too. Tulane wasn’t the only disruptive defense on the field.
One of the biggest concerns that I had about the Navy defense coming into this season wasn’t that they needed to blitz more, it was that they needed to be more effective when they did. One problem with the Navy defense last year was that their blitzes were telegraphed, making them easier to block and hanging DBs out to dry. Against Tulane, we saw how Navy’s blitzes are a little different this year. Here, near-side OLB is showing blitz, but after the snap, he backs off to spy the quarterback. Instead, the other two LBs blitz, with the middle linebacker breaking through the line to apply pressure. While the play doesn’t result in a sack, the pressure forces the quarterback to quickly check down to a receiver that is short of the first down.
Tulane was forced to punt after that.
We also saw some solid play out of the Navy defensive line. We often hear of the importance of the defensive line absorbing blockers to allow the linebackers to run to the ball. This next play is a perfect example. On third and two, Tulane called for an inside zone run. The running back is reading the defensive end who is double-teamed by the center and the left guard. The DE is forced outside, so read is to run inside of him, and the center peels off to make a block on the second level to clear the running lane. However, the nose guard, Jackson Pittman, beats his man and gets penetration into the running lane. That forces the running back to bounce outside, where he is met by Micah Thomas, who was able to read the play and scrape outside the C gap since no lineman was able to block him.
The Green Wave was stopped short of the first down.
It wasn’t a perfect performance, however. In the preview, I did caution that the Mids’ newfound aggression would spell disaster if it turned to recklessness. While it’s hard to call a defense holding another team to 14 points a “disaster,” there were times when gap assignments weren’t carried out as well as they should have been. Here, we have two players covering the same gap on a zone option. The outside linebacker is left unblocked as the quarterback’s read. He takes the running back, which the QB reads and proceeds outside. The inside linebacker should have taken on the block of the fullback outside to force the QB back inside, where he would have had to run through traffic. Instead, the ILB runs through the same gap as the OLB, and the quarterback is off to the races through the uncovered gap.
A few thoughts to wrap up:
— Abey’s turnovers are becoming a problem. I’m not quite as concerned about the interceptions since those can be corrected. Don’t forget that even Will Worth struggled throwing in his first few games, tending to hold onto the ball too long. He got better, and I suspect that Abey will eventually make better decisions as well. The fumbles, though, are an issue.
— The 4th & 12 play in the fourth quarter was a bit of a head-scratcher at the time. After reviewing the game, I’m still not in love with the call, but I think I know where it came from.
On the interception, the Mids lined up in a heavy formation, with an eligible receiver lined up at left tackle. After Navy used a fake toss for play action, the defense was slow to pick up the receiver when he went out on a pattern, which left him wide open on the backside of the play. The 4th & 12 call was also a fake toss out of a heavy formation. My guess is that when Abey saw that the WR/T was covered, he didn’t have anywhere else to go with the ball.
If that was the case, I’m still not a fan of the call; you have to expect the secondary dropping back when the offense needs 12 yards. I get the thinking, though.
— For all of the questions and concerns that have come from this game, the bottom line is that Navy won. Not only that, but I’m not sure that this is a game that the Mids would have won a year ago. Losing the turnover battle? Red zone interception? Giving up a fumble return for a touchdown? These aren’t things that will win you ballgames if you have to hold serve on every possession. The Mids have a lot to work on before the Cincinnati game, but it’s better to work on those things with one more win under your belt. Sure beats the alternative.