I won't say that I expected the Rice game to go as sideways as it did because I didn't. I did, however, think it was more dangerous than people were giving it credit for. There were a lot of things that didn't feel right. Rice is better than their record. Anyone who watched them play Tulane knew they were dangerous, especially defensively. With the head coaching change, the remaining staff had nothing to lose and would likely call plays accordingly. Plus, with Navy coming off a disappointing performance against Notre Dame, it was difficult to predict how they would respond. And that was before adding in five hours of delays. To me, the game had a bad vibe, and it only got worse after kickoff.

Defensively, the Mids were ok. They weren't perfect, but they played well enough to win most days. In the preview, we talked about how the last time Navy faced E.J. Warner, they made the mistake of trying to pressure him. This time, they were much more careful about when they brought extra pass rushers, and for the most part, it worked. Warner threw for 239 yards with a touchdown and an interception, which for him is pretty much par for the course. Dean Connors did have 105 rushing yards, although they weren't really a factor until the fourth quarter. The Mids were down 14-0 after the first quarter, partly because of an interception that gave the Owls the ball in Navy territory. After that, though, the next four Rice drives included an interception and three punts (including two three-and-outs). The Mids had every opportunity to take control of the game, but the offense couldn't deliver.

There were several reasons for that. A lot of it is because of Rice; Navy played poorly, but against a lesser defense, they might have gotten away with it. Field conditions had an impact as well. The result was an offensive performance that was just as bad as what we saw against Notre Dame, albeit a different flavor of bad.

With Army in the American Athletic Conference now, there is a new dynamic to Navy football. Over the years, you might have seen a team or two other than Air Force that played both teams in the same season. With both teams in the same league now, half their respective schedules do. That raises the question: who has the advantage? Is it the team that plays the common opponent first or the one that plays them last? The answer is that it depends. If the first option team loses the game, the second one has the advantage. The defense will probably recycle their game plan, so team #2 will know what to prepare for. But if option team #1 wins their game, the defense can figure out what went wrong with their plan and make changes. Not only will team #2 have to deal with more unknowns, but it will probably be a better plan after incorporating lessons learned. That was the case for Navy against Rice. After the Owls lost to Army, they made changes to their defense that helped them against the Mids.

In the preview, I speculated on what changes Rice would make, and I was right about some things and wrong about others. Rice used multiple fronts against Army, and I thought they would do the same against the Mids. They did. After playing man defense, I thought they would switch to zone against Navy. They did that, too, although it was more complicated than I suggested. I also guessed they might back off on their linebacker aggression to lean more on their defensive line. I get partial credit there; they definitely did not back off their LBs, but their defensive line had stretches of dominance.

We saw some changes right off the bat. Navy's first play was a wheel-post pattern, which is great against man coverage because it usually leaves a linebacker with a bad angle trying to chase down a snipe running up the sideline. And that's what happened here. The problem for Navy is that Rice's safeties weren't playing man this time. It was man coverage underneath, but the safeties were in a two-deep zone. The post pattern didn't draw the safety away, making it easy for him to make a play on the ball.

If that were the extent of the Rice game plan, it would have been easier to deal with. What made them unusual was that they mixed up their coverages. On the first play, they had two deep safeties. Sometimes, they only used one. Here's a play from Navy's second drive, when the Mids ran Eli Heidenreich on a fake jet sweep to the flat. Against two-deep man coverage, this is a great play. The snipe should beat his man to the perimeter and have plenty of grass in front of him if he can turn upfield. But that's not what happened. The cornerback followed the wide receiver, but the safety on the play side didn't give him deep help. Instead, he was the robber in a cover 1. After Heidenreich caught the pass, he was met immediately.

The ability to change coverages is rare against the option and probably only happens when a defense already has one option game under its belt. It made the passing game difficult. Because it was hard to stretch the field, it sort of forced the game into a phone booth. That still should have been fine, but it took Navy too long to find something that worked due to various factors.

In the preview, we mentioned that the strength of Rice's defense is their defensive line, especially on the interior. It was difficult to get movement from their defensive tackles. Likely because of this, a large part of the Navy run game early on was focused on running off tackle. When they run off tackle, the player lined up on the end (either the snipe or the tight end) is supposed to load from the B-gap defender to an inside linebacker. That means they first help to get outside leverage on the line before moving to a linebacker if they can. When it works, it looks like this:

That can also set up play action with that end blocker faking a load block and running the other way.

The problem is that Rice's defensive line was a handful. Getting leverage consistently was difficult, and that was when they weren't also disrupting plays by getting into the backfield.

I don't know why Rice was so dominant on the line. Maybe their stemming had the offensive line mixed up with their assignments or forced into taking bad angles. Maybe Rice was physically superior. Or maybe the Mids were just off. Whatever the reason, it was Navy's biggest problem.

Rice's superiority at the line of scrimmage kept blockers from getting to the linebackers, which made them more aggressive.

In theory, there should be answers for this. Linebackers aggressively playing the fullback should open up counters, and it did. Here's a counter trey option, with the offense selling the pulling linemen hard by adding motion in the same direction. The linebackers and the backside safety both followed, which left a lot of room for the quarterback on the option the other way.

You should also be able to get outside leverage on defenders too preoccupied with inside runs, and again, Navy did. Here, the linebackers read fullback trap, but it was actually a counter option. Horvath was able to get outside and turn the corner.

The jet sweep on the power read could also outflank the defense.

Unfortunately for Navy, they couldn't do this consistently. Some of the issue was that the playing surface was atrocious. Turning the corner became a gamble.

Some of it was because of Rice's defense. On this play, the pitch read played the quarterback, but he couldn't pitch the ball because the robber safety had strung out the play. The trailing defensive end also made it difficult to fake a pitch and cut inside.

But the worst problem was Navy's mental lapses.

The aggressive linebackers left Rice open to a reverse, which Navy ran. However, the receiver didn't block his man, who blew up the play.

On this play, it looks like there was a blocking mixup. The tight end block what should have been the pitch key, leaving the safety unblocked.

I suppose it's possible that the TE blocked the right player, but if that's the case, I don't know how the angles were supposed to work there.

Eventually, Navy just decided to power their way ahead, using the fullback as an extra blocker and running the quarterback off tackle:

They could also run play action off of this, similar to the fake load block from earlier:

But at this point, it was too little, too late. The drive with this play ended on a fourth-down slip. Eventually, the Mids put together an 18-play scoring drive, but 18-play drives are not what you want when it's the fourth quarter and you're down three scores.

As for why the Mids underperformed, I don't know. Is it possible that the long delays affected the team mentally? Sure. It's definitely harder for the visiting team to wait out a five-hour delay in their smelly, cramped locker room than it is for the home team to wait in their more comfortable environs. Some things can only be answered by the people in that room, and there's no value in speculating.

Perhaps it's best to chalk it up to a lesson learned. Navy is 6-2, which anyone would have taken at the beginning of the season. They are still in the driver's seat when it comes to meeting their goals. However, the schedule doesn't get any easier from here. The season can turn south in a hurry if Navy doesn't right the ship.

The time for learning lessons is over. Now the Mids must apply them.