In the preview, we talked about the history of the Navy-Notre Dame series and how some of Navy's most celebrated teams suffered blowout losses at the hands of the Irish. I hypothesized that the more press Navy receives, the more seriously Notre Dame treats the game. They play to win, not to work on some things against a lesser opponent. And I still think that's a factor. However, Brian Newberry offered another explanation after the Mids' 51-14 thrashing on Saturday.
"I thought the stage might have been a little big for us today," he said. "A lot of mistakes. We had guys afraid to make mistakes. When you play with fear in your heart like that, that is when mistakes happen. I thought we had some guys try to play outside of themselves. We talked about not doing that in a game like this. You just have to be yourself. You have to be the best version of yourself, and we just weren't that today."
It's an interesting observation. People worry about hype giving players big heads and "choking on the sugar" and whatnot, but I've always thought that's an unfair assumption. These guys aren't far removed from hard times. They know what got them here. But so much of the coverage around the Mids, especially last week, has been about the stakes and what the game meant for Navy history. "Not since 1979," "First time since World War II," and "Playoff" have been the themes of almost every story.
So maybe that's another explanation for ranked Navy teams laying an egg against Notre Dame: the burden of history and being hailed as Navy's chance to return to the glory days. Newberry tells the team to tune that stuff out, and I believe they do. But you can't tune it out completely. After all, it's impossible to ignore if you're getting interviewed by the New York Times or appearing on College GameDay.
It's as good as any other explanation for why Navy made so many uncharacteristic mistakes against Notre Dame.
Any competitor worth his salt wants the chance to go up against the best. That's what the Notre Dame game has always represented on the Navy schedule and why it's such a recruiting draw. When you get those opportunities, the one thing you hope is to give your best shot. If you do and come up short, so be it. But if you don't give your best shot-- if you make blunder after blunder that you haven't done all season-- you'll be left wondering what if. And that's where Navy found itself after the final whistle.
The sheer number of mistakes almost defies belief, especially from a team that has avoided such things all season. There were blunders on special teams. Navy fumbled the ball seven times and lost five of them. Miscommunication in the secondary resulted in wide-open receivers. And worst of all, nothing was caused by anything Notre Dame did. They were all self-inflicted wounds.
Adding to the frustration is that defensively, Notre Dame lined up exactly how we thought they would, and it appeared that Navy's offense had answers when they weren't busy earning medals for foot marksmanship.
In the preview, we talked about how Notre Dame likes to use multiple fronts against Navy and that they'd likely do it again this year. Indeed, that was the case. We saw them line up in an 8-man front:
...a 6-man front:
...and a 5-man front:
Often, the defense would shift from one to another based on Navy's pre-snap shifts.
Early in the game, when they lined up in a 5-man front, the Irish would play man defense with the safeties against the snipes. That didn't last long, though. For most of the afternoon, Notre Dame used a three-deep zone regardless of how they lined up. When they used two deep safeties, one would step up in run support based on the motion Navy used. When they were in an 8-man front, the deep safety would follow the motion while a backside defender rotated to cover the deep middle. This is what drove most of Navy's playcalling.
Navy's goal was to slow down the deep middle safety by making him have to think. They did this by running plays with motion, away from motion, neither, and sometimes both at the same time. The variety made it difficult for the safety to be aggressive, forcing him to read the play instead of reacting to it. Because the defense was counting on using the safety to outnumber the blockers on the perimeter, the offense would have an advantage if they could make him take longer to get there.
Notre Dame's defense was rooted in what they did against Navy's old offense, so when the Mids wanted to run in the direction of the motion, they lined up more in the traditional double-slot look. They ran a few triple option plays:
They also ran a lot of inside zone:
With the triple, there was a chance that the quarterback could read his way outside. The inside zone, however, looks like the triple but is a designed handoff to the fullback up the middle. This makes the safety tired of over-running the play, so he won't be as aggressive running outside.
To give the safety even more reason to mind the middle of the field, the Mids also ran inside zone from the shotgun, but with a new twist. They motioned the fullback into the backfield and ran the play off of both zone option and zone triple option looks.
To further confuse the safety, Navy also ran misdirection. Likely knowing what Notre Dame's plan would be, they ran a counter trey to Eli Heidenreich on their second play from scrimmage.
They also ran the triple option using twirl motion to get the safety to take his first step in the wrong direction:
The Mids also used lateral passing to keep the safety guessing which direction to run. They ran a tunnel screen:
They also ran slant routes. The corners were in soft coverage to give them a chance to read the play and possibly help in run support. This left a window for a route run underneath them if the ball was delivered before the safety could get there.
Making the safety slow to react set up Navy's best play of the day, Blake Horvath's touchdown run on a counter option. The counter motion slowed the safety down enough for Cody Howard to get in front of him, keeping him from getting to the perimeter to make a play.
The Mids also ran option plays designed to go in different directions. Here is the counter trey option, with the fullback running one direction and the quarterback running another. The safety has to read the play to make sure he doesn't go the wrong way.
The power read is a different concept, but it had a similar effect. If the quarterback got a give read, the jet sweep was fast enough to outflank the safety and pick up decent yardage. But if the quarterback got a keep read, he could cut behind the overpursuing defense.
You'll recall that Charlotte used a similar defense against the Mids, so we also saw some of the same plays. Here we see the same play as Alex Tecza's touchdown catch from last week, with a wheel-post pattern combined with a drag route. Brandon Chatman was lined up in the backfield here like a second fullback and ran the wheel route. It almost looks like they were hiding him behind the offensive line, hoping he'd be too short for the defense to notice him coming out of the backfield.
We also saw some razzle-dazzle with the double-reverse flea flicker. Alex Tecza looked like he was a lead blocker on a jet sweep before he turned upfield.
Navy ran other plays, but they all fit the general theme. They moved the ball pretty well when they weren't giving it away. It was harder to run against Notre Dame; plays that would go for five or six yards against other teams went for three or four yards against the Irish. Still, the Mids could stay on schedule for the most part, and they had a few big gains. They just couldn't hold onto the football.
Fans roll their eyes at coaching cliches like "learning how to win," but this is precisely what coaches mean when they say that. This won't be the last big game Navy plays, and if there's a silver lining, at least now they know what to expect. Indeed, all the goals the Mids had at the start of the season are still on the table. But they'll have to put this game behind them to achieve them.
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