Humans marvel at things that stand the test of time. Egyptian civilization is gone, but the Great Pyramid of Giza still rises out of the desert on the edge of Cairo. Rome was sacked, but the Pont du Gard Aqueduct stands tall, 160 feet over the Gardon River. It seems improbable that any structure could last that long, especially as technology advances exponentially and things become more disposable. Having endured 5,000 years on Salisbury Plain, Stonehenge reminds us that, as advanced as we think we’ve become, our ancestors knew a thing or two about quality.

In college football, Army-Navy is the ancient wonder, the monument to an earlier sporting civilization. There was a time before NIL, before the transfer portal, before continent-spanning superconferences, when great rivalries defined entire seasons for schools. When young men played sports because that’s what well-rounded college men did. That’s Army-Navy: the last refuge for those of us who, unlike the sport’s caretakers, love college football for what it has always been.

Not that the game itself is immune to change. Over the last few years, writing a preview for Army-Navy had become difficult. Sure, every season brings a new set of players and previous games to analyze, but in the end, Army-Navy always boiled down to one thing. One option team would line up against another, and because they knew each other so well, it was nearly impossible to move the ball. Army-Navy has been the soccer game of football games. Those who appreciate soccer do so because it’s intense from beginning to end. The game can turn on one exceptional moment that could happen at any time. Those who don’t appreciate soccer just look at it as “low-scoring? Blah.” Army-Navy has been the same way.

This year, there is a new story. Ken Niumatalolo, who has been on the sideline in some capacity for every Army-Navy game of the last 20 years, is gone. Jeff Monken remains, but the offense he used to get the Army job in the first place does not. Army is casting off independence and joining the American Athletic Conference. The game itself isn’t even in its traditional home of Philadelphia; for the first time, it will be played in New England at Foxborough’s Gillette Stadium. Change is everywhere, but does that mean we’ll see a different kind of game on the field? I doubt it.

For Army, the big story this year has been the change to a new offense. Brent Davis, who spent nine years as Army’s offensive coordinator, was let go. In his place, Monken hired Drew Thatcher from Division II Nebraska-Kearney. At UNK, Thatcher rewrote the record books. In 2019, his offense set a school record record with 4,115 rushing yards on the way to their first winning campaign in eight years. They won 18 games in 2021 and 2022, their most successful two-year stretch in a decade. There’s no question that Thatcher knows how to move the football.

But why would Monken change what he’s done for nearly his entire career? On the record, he gave two reasons. One was that he saw the writing on the wall regarding what the cut blocking rule change meant for option offenses. The other was that he was tired of being unable to move the ball in service academy games. Against Navy and Air Force over the last two years, Army averaged a mere 108 yards per game on the ground. Monken was tired of it.

“Those games are like if you said, ‘O.K., two guys are going to fight. You each get a sledgehammer and you hit him as hard as you can with a sledgehammer, and then he gets to hit you back with his sledgehammer, and then you hit him back with a sledgehammer, and the last one standing wins,” Monken told Sports Illustrated over the summer. “I’m not saying this offense is all of a sudden going to blow the doors off of it and we’re going to score all these points. I have no idea, but I know we need to give ourselves a better chance to win the football game on offense and score more points.”

I suspect there was also an unsaid third reason. Monken’s name has been thrown around for a few years now in some power conference coaching searches, but he’s still at West Point. I don’t know how real those mentions were; it could have just been his agent feeding his name to anyone who would listen. But if they were, in fact, real, then there’s the possibility that he’s frustrated with the “option coach” label. Monken has never struck me as wanting to take the first new job that comes along, but I do think he has a few in mind as a next stop. Kansas and Illinois are two jobs I think he’d want, but they turned elsewhere in their recent coaching searches. The combination of the option stink and the rules being stacked against it may have been too much to ignore.

Whatever the reason, Monken made the change. And the results have been, well, mixed. Army is one of the most confusing teams in the country. On the one hand, they beat UTSA, who was an AAC contender this season. They played tough against both Syracuse and Boston College. They also beat Air Force by 20. On the other hand, they lost to both ULM and UMass, were shut out by Troy, and would have lost to Holy Cross if not for a blocked punt returned for a touchdown. And then, to throw a wrench into all of it, they completely changed offenses against Coastal Carolina, returning to their old under-center option. They played their best game of the season, running for 365 yards. It boggles the mind.

So what gives? Is the Coastal Carolina game a sign that Monken has given up on the new offense? Was it all an elaborate ruse to make Navy's coaches scramble for a new defensive game plan at the last minute? I would bet that the answer to both questions is no.

After the Coastal Carolina game, Monken stated that he felt like changing offenses would catch the Chanticleers off guard. He's already indicated that Thatcher would be back calling the plays against Navy. Sure, it could all be mind games, and I'm sure Army will have a package ready that uses their old offense. But if one of the main reasons you changed offenses in the first place was for service academy games, and it actually worked in the first service academy game, does it make sense to change? I don't think so.

That would disappoint those who have grown frustrated with the new offense. Army is 117th in the country in total offense and 111th in scoring offense. They are running for 80 fewer yards per game than last year. Plenty of people would argue that changing offenses was a mistake, and maybe they have a point. There are two things to consider with any offense. One, does the scheme make sense fundamentally? And two, can you run it with the people you have? Thatcher has already answered the first question. The second is still up for debate. Nebraska-Kearney didn't have the same talent differential against their opponents that Army has against theirs; I'd wager that UNK wins more recruiting battles against Fort Hays State than Army wins against Syracuse. Thatcher also had quarterback TJ Davis at UNK, who was a two-time finalist for the Harlon Hill Trophy. There are no would-be Heisman finalists on the roster at West Point. One could argue that the scheme doesn't match the talent.

At this point, though, I don't think that's a fair conclusion. In Monken's first year, Army went 4-8 and lost to Yale. They were 2-10 the following year. It wasn't until year three that the team and the offense put everything together. Army, like the other service academies, is a developmental program. The formula for winning is based on having a team full of seniors trained to do their one thing over four years. That doesn't mean the new offense will work, but any significant change at a service academy has to be given time before it can be evaluated fairly.

Whether it'll work in the long run is of little importance at the moment, though. Right now, the only thing that matters is if it will work on Saturday.

While Army's old and new offenses are often framed as "option" and "not option," that isn't accurate. The new offense still runs option plays, but it's out of the shotgun and uses more inside zone and split zone out of various formations. As we've discussed, there are tradeoffs when you run out of the shotgun. Plays in the shotgun develop more slowly. Zone running also rewards patient runners more than those who hit the line quickly. In a way, that helps with the cut blocking rule. Cut blocking is used in option offenses because it immediately gets defenders on the ground, which is helpful when the plays hit quickly. On slower-developing plays, that would give defenders time to recover. However, blocking can also be more complicated for players lined up in the backfield. On some plays, they have to make the same read the quarterback does to know what path they should take to their blocking assignment. It can get complicated, and complicated is the enemy of fast.

Perhaps that has been an issue, or maybe Army's problems lie elsewhere. Either way, the effect is noticeable. The sense of inevitability that once came with Army's offense is no longer there. In 2018, they led the nation in third down conversion percentage with over 57%. They hadn't reached that mark since then, but they still never finished lower than 44%, which was 32nd in the country last year. This year, they are 73rd in the country, converting at a 38% rate. The problem starts on first down. Last year, Army was second in the nation in first-down rushing efficiency, averaging 6.24 yards per carry. This year, they are 58th, with a 4.66 ypc average. For comparison, Navy is 27th at 5.29 ypc. This is a massive blow for a program once known for staying on schedule.

So no, Army's offense isn't good. But are they good enough? People might point to Air Force's turnovers as the leading factor in Army's upset, and they wouldn't be wrong. But Army also ran for 213 yards in that game. Navy sure as hell didn't. If Army could run like that on Saturday, it would be their highest rushing total against the Mids since 2018. And the way Navy's offense has played, it's probably enough to win.

Statistically, Army is led by junior quarterback Bryson Daily, who has 817 yards and seven TDs. Daily won't win any track meets, but he's a tough runner who knows how to get the extra yard. More importantly, he's more comfortable running his offense than his backup, freshman Champ Harris, who was pressed into action after Daily missed time with a mid-season injury. Freshman running back Kanye Udoh has run for 436 yards on 5.1 ypc, although he didn't get any carries in the Coastal Carolina game. Sophomore Noah Short leads the team with 18 catches.

Fourth-year junior Isaiah Alston is the leading big-play threat but hasn't played since suffering an injury in practice in September. Monken has said it would take a miracle for Alston to play against Navy, although we've seen such miracles recently. His loss was an enormous blow to the Army offense. In Army's four September games, they had 19 plays of 20+ yards. They've had 15 in the seven games since then. In a game where big plays usually make the difference, Alston's absence will be felt.

The Mids should get a boost from the return of defensive end Jacob Busic, who has been out since the Memphis game with a torn bicep. Justin Reed has been stellar in his place, but Busic's return gives the Mids situational flexibility and the ability to keep more fresh legs on the line.

Offensively, the Mids want to avoid a repeat of the Air Force game. Army's defense has struggled against the run the last two years. This year, they've given up 180 yards per game on the ground, 116th in the country. Still, that's better than Temple, and we all know how that game went. Whatever other issues they might have, Army knows how to defend the option. They played well against Air Force, limiting the Falcons to 155 yards on the ground and getting six turnovers. How can a Navy offense that has struggled with the fundamentals all season move the ball against a defense that stops option teams playing their best?

I have a feeling a lot of the plays we've seen since the UAB game-- the counter trey option and counter trey triple-- were initially intended for Army. While they worked wonders at first, they haven't been as successful in the long term, and Navy hasn't moved the ball since. There are a few reasons for that; some of it was due to poor blocking, and some of it was because of quarterback reads. Hopefully, after two weeks of practice, Xavier Arline will be more comfortable with those reads.

Against Air Force, Navy wanted to give the quarterback a chance to improvise, and I suspect that will be part of the plan again on Saturday. The Mids will likely use some one-man passing routes, similar to what they did against Temple. If the quarterback sees that the receiver is open early on, he'll throw. If not, he'll scramble. Braxton Woodson tended to wait too long before deciding to run, but Arline is more experienced and has done well with these plays in the past. It offers some hope the second time around.

But only so much. Passing the ball won't be easy against an experienced Army secondary with three fifth-year players. Safety Quindrelin Hammonds is the group's leader, with 58 tackles and three INTs. Against the option, Army also likes to bring Hammonds closer to the line of scrimmage, and he had two TFLs, including a sack, against Air Force. Strong safety play in general has been a thorn in Navy's side all season, and they will not get a reprieve against the Black Knights.

Despite Army's new offense, Saturday's game is still shaping up to follow the Army-Navy formula. Field position and special teams will be crucial factors. Turnovers will kill. Offense will be less about sustaining drives and more about showing something new to catch the defense off guard and setting up for the big play. Change may have come to Army-Navy, but some things never will.

For the Mids, this truly is a one-game season. A 6-6 record with a win over Army will be remembered as progress. A losing record with a loss to Army will feel like another step backward. A season of struggles can be redeemed with one final push to glory, a fitting reward for a senior class that persevered through hardship.

Semper proficere.