The Temple game was arguably the worst performance of the year for the Navy defense. Maybe Notre Dame was worse, but it's never a surprise when Notre Dame plays like the college football royalty they are. Playing this poorly against Temple, on the other hand— E.J. Warner threw for 402 yards— was a surprise.

I had thought the Mids matched up well against the Temple offense and that it would lead to turnovers. Sure enough, Warner did throw two interceptions. For the most part, though, Temple cut through Navy at will. The Mids would blitz, and there were open receivers. The Mids rushed only three or four, and there were open receivers. And when receivers were covered, Warner would make an NFL-caliber throw.

Temple had a great offensive game plan. Warner played like a pro. Sometimes the other team has your number. It happens.

It doesn't have to mean an automatic loss, though. Shootouts happen every week in college football. But it takes two to make a shootout, and at this point in the season for Navy, they just can't hang. The defense has to play almost a perfect game for the team to have a chance. Five of Navy's first seven drives on Saturday were three-and-outs. We're at a point where even picking up a first down feels like an accomplishment.

Before we get to the root cause of the problem, let's take a look at how the Temple game went.

Defensively, the Owls threw a little bit of a curveball. While they are a base 3-4 team, they lined up in an even front against Navy. But not just any even front; it was like a 4-3 stack. The secondary would line up within 6-7 yards of the line of scrimmage. The outside linebackers were stacked behind the B gap, inside the tackle box. They would sometimes shift toward the field if the ball was on one of the hash marks. They also shifted based on the offense's formation, but if the formation was balanced, the linebackers were stacked. It was like having three ILBs. After the snap, the "outside" linebackers read the play, and if they saw it going outside, they scraped.

Ideally, you wouldn't have to do anything special against this. You would just run the triple and make the scraping linebacker the pitch key. The problem is that when Navy tried this, the defensive end used a mesh charge, which Xavier Arline had difficulty reading.

This is probably the most difficult read for an option quarterback, so it's no surprise that Arline was rusty. He'll get better as he takes more reps. But against Temple, the coaches had to find something else that would work.

When opponents stack the box like that, it often makes sense to run outside zone. It gets the defense moving laterally, which can open up cutback lanes. The Mids ran it on Saturday.

But they only ran it twice. I don't understand why. These plays went for 4-5 yards apiece. Arline is good at running them. Why they didn't run more of it, I don't know.

That is also true of running the midline option. When the Mids lined up with three receivers on one side of the formation, the linebackers shifted to compensate. The Mids then ran the QB/FB midline to the backside.

Again, these were effective plays, but the Mids only ran them three times. One of those plays was a missed read, but another went for 20 yards. Why didn't we see more of it? There was a time when Navy would find 2-3 plays that worked for them, and they would run those plays until the defense stopped them. That approach might have helped here, but we'll talk more about playcalling later.

The coaches looked for other ways to attack this defense. With the defensive end's mesh charge making him difficult to manage as a dive/keep read, the Mids tried using him as a pitch read instead. They tried using the midline triple, but the scraping linebacker would either go unblocked, or the tackle would be unable to get leverage.

Since we saw how the tackle had trouble blocking the linebacker, the Mids tried other ways to block him. Here, they ran a double option, using the mesh-charging defensive end as the pitch key. On this play, they tried using the fullback to block the scraping linebacker. He also couldn't get leverage, and even if he could, the cornerback was left unblocked.

The Mids also tried running a double option out of a different formation using the fullback to block the cornerback. The slotback would then block the scraping linebacker. But that didn't work either.

The Mids also tried running the inverted veer. When Arline made the right read, sometimes it worked.

However, we've seen in recent weeks that both Tai Lavatai and Braxton Woodson have had trouble making this read, and Arline had issues with it, too.

And sometimes the right read didn't matter, because the Mids still couldn't block the scraping linebacker.

With the linebackers stacked inside, one would think a toss play would make sense. But when Navy tried it, they couldn't block anyone.

If Temple was so ready to jump on the toss, maybe it would make sense to fake a toss and run the other way. But when the Mids tried that, nobody was fooled. The fullback was again assigned to the scraping linebacker, which left the cornerback unblocked.

Halfway through the fourth quarter, the Mids finally found something that worked for them. Arline pitched off of the defensive end. The playside tackle released outside to block the safety, which allowed the wide receiver to block the scraping linebacker. The playside slotback blocked the cornerback.

By then, the Mids were down two scores and running out of time. Running the ball was less of a priority.

Brian Newberry fell on his sword a little bit in his Monday Zoom call when asked if his team should have tried throwing the ball sooner. He said he felt at the time it was important to get back to running the ball and executing the basics, which is understandable after a game like Air Force where the game plan is atypical. Still, he said in hindsight that he should have taken to the air earlier in the game. Indeed, when a defense is packing the box the way Temple was, you have to show that you're willing to pass.

But Newberry is just taking accountability for his team's performance. In actuality, the Mids did try to throw early in the game. But when they did, Arline was either sacked, forced to scramble, or threw for a minimal gain.

The difference in the second half wasn't that Navy threw the ball, but how Navy threw the ball. After halftime, the Mids simplified their passing game. Instead of having Arline go through his progressions, they ran pass plays where the ball was intended to go to only one receiver. All the other routes were designed to make room for that one and only target. If that route was open, Arline would throw the ball. If it was covered, Arline knew to start running. This also helped the offensive line since they wouldn't have to keep the pocket intact for very long.

Let's look at Navy's first touchdown, a 24-yard pass to Eli Heidenreich. Most of Navy's earlier passing attempts came on short hitch patterns, like these:

But on this play, Heidenreich-- who has already become one of the best pass-catching slotbacks of the last 20 years-- ran a hitch and go. The hitch drew in his defender, which allowed him to create space to get open when he ran his post route. The other receivers ran routes to ensure there would be no help in the middle of the field.

Now look at this play. The Mids ran a fake bubble screen to draw in defenders, then had Alex Tecza come out of the backfield on a route that was designed to get him matched up with a linebacker. And it did, but the linebacker held him (with no call). Seeing this, Arline immediately took off.

(I'm not one for conspiracy theories, but there has been a trend recently in conference games where Navy's opponents aren't getting penalized much, if at all. Take a look at the hand to the face/push-off that Mbiti Williams takes on this play. How is this not called? If nothing else, this is terrible officiating.)

Finally, we have this play. Arline has a defender in his face, but since the play was designed to go to one receiver-- Heidenreich on a post route-- he knew where to throw the ball. Because the other receivers ran the secondary out of the play, he knew the middle of the field was clear.

Plays like this were a big part of the passing offense in 2019. This is also what Navy wanted to do against Air Force, but Woodson would hold onto the ball for too long before taking off. Arline has the experience to know when to run. It's fair to ask if the Mids would have fared better against Temple if they started running plays like this sooner, but that could be asked about any adjustment in any game.

On the plus side, Arline looked good. Physically, he was the best Navy quarterback we've seen this year. He is easily the most capable runner of the group, and while the sample size is small, his throws were as good as Lavatai's. He did struggle with some reads, though. That will likely get better with time, but time isn't a luxury the Mids have anymore. Still, for those who pine for stability at quarterback, Arline might be the one to give it to you.

Not that quarterback is the Navy offense's biggest concern. Navy's played four different quarterbacks this year, and the offense hasn't looked good with any of them. They've certainly had high points, but even in their better games, they've had streaks of inconsistency. And lately, the high points have been getting fewer and farther between. But if the problem isn't all on the quarterbacks, then what is it?

I've had a feeling for a while. Earlier in the season, I wrote about how the Mids had an advantage over their opponents because they were unveiling a new offense. At first, teams didn't know what to expect. A pattern emerged; against Memphis and USF, Navy came out hot in the first half but slowed down in the second half once the defenses figured out what they were dealing with. The same pattern is playing out in the context of the season. After the opener, Navy averaged 26 points over the next four games. They've averaged just over 12 points per game in their last three. Now that there's film, Navy isn't catching anyone off guard anymore.

But what have opposing defenses figured out? What did they realize mid-game and mid-season? What is the problem with Navy's offense?

The problem is that Navy is still unable to block on the perimeter.

I can already hear the groans. "Wasn't that the problem last year? You need to move on from the cut blocking rule!" Yes, it was a big problem last year. But this isn't about the cut blocking rule; it's about how the new offense adjusts to it.

First, let's be clear about what the old rule was. I've heard some TV commentary that talked about the rule change in regard to offensive line play. The rule has nothing to do with the offensive line. The new rule prohibits cut blocking outside of the tackle box. Previously, any player lined up inside the tackle box at the beginning of the play was allowed to cut. Not anymore. For Navy, with the slotbacks no longer allowed to cut, the pitch man on the option had a hard time turning upfield last year because the play would get strung out.

The new offense tries to take a different approach to blocking on the perimeter. One thing you've probably noticed about the new Navy offense is that there are new formations and motions. You've probably also noticed more motion and shifting than before. The reason for these changes-- all of them-- is perimeter blocking.

The new formations are designed to give the defense unbalanced looks in the hope that they will be similarly unbalanced. With the motion, the idea is to create a numbers advantage by changing the alignment of the formation before the defense can adjust. Sometimes, the offense motions away from the play, hoping that defenders will follow and take themselves out of position. Instead of cut blocking, the slotbacks try to get leverage. On most plays, it's the slotback and a wide receiver tasked with perimeter blocking. One tries to get inside leverage, one tries to get outside leverage, and the ball carrier tries to run between them.

It isn't working, at least not consistently. Instead, we've seen bad angles, missed assignments, and unblocked defenders. And it's affecting everything that Navy tries to do.

How many pitch plays have we seen this year that accomplished anything? Tecza had a spectacular option pitch in the first half of the first conference game. Brandon Chatman had a 20-yard run off a double option pitch against USF. That's it, that's the list. Defenses don't fear the option pitch anymore. And because they don't fear the pitch, most are stacking the box. That wasn't as much of a problem back when the offensive line was healthy; the Mids still managed a passable offense by pounding the ball up the middle, and sometimes Tecza and Daba Fofana even managed to break loose. But the offensive line is no longer healthy. They aren't getting the same push they used to. The combination of a battered offensive line with more defenses realizing that there isn't much of a perimeter threat is why the offense has worsened over the last month.

The banged-up line puts offensive coordinator Grant Chesnut in a catch-22. His line is hurt. He doesn't have the depth he needs to rotate more players in. He needs to stop hitting so hard in practice so his players can heal. But he also knows those full-contact reps are what build the depth on the line that option teams need to succeed. To stop hitting would draw out the problem. There is no good answer.

The more the season has progressed, the more confused I've been trying to figure out what kind of playcalling series there are in the new offense. Generally, in an option offense, you start with the triple option. When the defense adjusts to stop the triple, the offense has a few plays to counter that adjustment. The defense adjusts again, and the cycle continues. For example, maybe the defense adjusts to the triple by squatting the defensive end. The offense adjusts by running the fullback trap. The defense adjusts by bringing a safety into the box, and the offense adjusts by throwing play action over the top. That's series football.

But what if the triple doesn't work in the first place? More often than not, Navy isn't just adjusting to what the defense is doing. They're adjusting to what they can't do themselves. As a result, there sometimes doesn't appear to be any rhyme or reason to the playcalling. The solution, it seems to my untrained eye, has been to throw as many different looks at the defense as they can, presumably hoping to catch the defense out of position. And to be fair, they have at times, which is why we've seen more big plays this year. But those big plays have been oases in a desert of three and outs, and they haven't made up for the inconsistency.

On the Navy Football Podcast, Keenan Reynolds discussed the offense needing to find an identity. I agree with him up to a point. I think the disjointed playcalling situation I just described is precisely what Reynolds calls a lack of identity. Where I disagree is that I believe the lack of identity to be a symptom, not the disease. I see the problem as practical, not philosophical. It's not that the coaches don't want to establish an identity. It's that they can't; not before they figure out how to block on the perimeter.

This is why changing the quarterbacks doesn't matter to me. Even if one guy is marginally better than the others, it doesn't address the fundamental problem. Neither do any of the other things I get bombarded with during and after every game. No, throwing more short passes doesn't fix this. No, throwing fewer passes doesn't fix this. No, firing the AD very obviously doesn't fix this. You can't just paint over rust. Navy is a triple option team that can't run the triple option. They can't run the triple because they can't block on the perimeter. Until that problem is solved, nothing else matters.

Unfortunately, I am not smart enough to know if this is a problem with the scheme or just a matter of getting more reps. The slotbacks were already one of the youngest positions on the team, and they're the position most affected by the change in the offense. Against Temple, it seemed there was an effort to simplify things, at least a little. We saw a lot more of the old double-slot spread-ish and double flex formations of seasons past. It didn't make any difference.

If there's one thing you should take from all of this, it's that it's not an easy fix. Some of the best option football minds in the game have attempted to solve this problem for two years now, so maybe @realname88410791 on Twitter should realize his super-obvious solution of "just call the good plays" would have been tried already if the answer was that simple. Sadly, it is not. You don't have to trust the process if you don't want to, but you can't rush it, either.