Memphis beat Navy on Thursday night in the conference opener for both teams. The week off is bad timing for the Mids; that was the kind of game you want to move past as quickly as possible. But since I’m out of town and unable to make breakdown videos, at least I get the silver lining of having a little extra time to write the debrief. Still, there is a lot that we probably don’t want to wait to talk about. Coming into this season, the new-look Navy offense was the team’s biggest question mark. Now that they have three games under their belts, what do we think about the offense so far?

Wagner was indeed a ruse

The Mids beat Wagner, 24-0, in a game that was never really in doubt. However, the team’s performance wasn’t all that convincing. It felt like they sleepwalked past what should have been an overmatched opponent. That was particularly true when the Mids had the ball; a supposedly new offense looked a whole lot like the old one in both scheme and execution. Those who came into the season with optimism started bracing themselves for a rebuilding year.

That may have been premature. In the debrief, I argued that the Wagner game wasn’t what it seemed. Based on what we saw (an offense that appeared unchanged) and what we didn’t see (obvious plays that would’ve taken advantage of what the defense was doing), I felt it likely that the Navy game plan was to avoid showing the new offense to Memphis. I wasn’t alone in that opinion. With what we saw against the Tigers, I think it’s safe to say that our suspicions were correct.

But if that’s the case, it raises another question.

Was Memphis just caught off guard?

How much of Navy’s offensive resurgence was because the Memphis defense had prepared for something else?

Navy ran for 299 yards, which is a much more Navy-like number than we have seen lately. We still don’t know what a “normal” rushing performance looks like in the new offense, but it felt good to get a dose of the good ol’ days. But a longer look at the numbers might reveal a lurking problem. Navy had almost twice as many rushing yards in the first half (196) as they did in the second (103). The Memphis defense regrouped at halftime. After scoring a touchdown on their first possession of the third quarter, the Mids went three-and-out on their next three.

This is why Navy’s missed first-half opportunities were so critical. The Mids had to maximize their possessions while they still had Memphis guessing. Instead, they ended the half with three scoreless drives, including a lost fumble and a failed fourth-and-one attempt. And now, the cat’s out of the bag, at least partially. There’s still more the the offense to be revealed, but the more Navy plays, the more relevant film there is to study.

Does that mean Navy’s first-half production was misleading? It’s possible. The good news is that most teams start preparing their Navy game plans as early as the spring, putting in a period or two of option prep in each practice. But if they’ve been planning since the spring, then the offense they’ve been preparing for is the old offense. Future opponents may have to scramble a bit to prepare for the new one. If that’s the case, then those first-half drives will continue to be important.

The return of the big play

There was a time when Navy’s was among the most explosive offenses in the country. That hasn’t been the case over the last three seasons. In 2019, the Mids were 16th nationally in plays of 20+ yards. Last year, they were 112th. The year before, they were dead last. Obviously, this is a problem. While it’s fun to revel in 15-play, marathon drives, you can’t count on them. You may remember that Paul Johnson’s explanation for why Navy switched to a bend-don’t-break defense in 2003 was because the more you force college players to take one more snap, the more likely it is they’ll make a mistake. The same principle applies to Navy. And in recent years, there have been lots of mistakes.

Against Memphis, though, it was big plays that sustained the Navy offense. Tai Lavatai threw a touchdown pass to Regis Velez. Brandon Chatman had a 58-yard reception. Alex Tecza ran past the defense for a 75-yard score. More than half of Navy’s rushing output came on six plays.

The lack of big plays led to speculation among fans and media that the reason was a lack of talent. Hopefully, watching a fullback run past a Memphis secondary made it clear that talent isn’t a problem.

Two quarterbacks

Lavatai started the game and played the entire first half. He also led Navy’s touchdown drive in the third quarter, with the pass to Chatman being the key play in the possession. However, the Mids went three-and-out on their next three drives, which prompted a change under center. Blake Horvath came in and led the Mids to a field goal after a 29-yard scramble. He lost a fumble on the next Navy possession. Lavatai would lead the Mids on their last drive.

For some reason, playing two quarterbacks makes some people very upset. It shouldn’t. I understand not wanting a situation where two QBs are necessary, but sometimes that’s what gives you the best chance to win. If you had one quarterback who can do everything you need, you’d play him. But if you don’t, you have to do something else.

Both quarterbacks bring different things to the table. Lavatai has experience, doesn’t get rattled, knows the offense, and has been making great throws. However, he is not a strong runner. Horvath is, but he lacks experience. Ivin Jasper told us a month ago that Horvath had to make better decisions. Ideally, you want a quarterback who can go out and win games for you. Navy doesn’t have that player, at least not yet. If you don’t have a quarterback who can win the game for you, you at least want one who won’t lose it for you. That’s Lavatai. Having Lavatai manage the game but bringing in Horvath if you need a spark seems like a reasonable plan.

Eventually, Horvath will get there, and it might even be this season. He also isn’t the only young quarterback with promise on the roster. Eventually, someone will step up and claim the job. Until then, though, there’s nothing wrong with playing two quarterbacks. Embrace the process.

What’s the future of the slotback position?

After the game, I tweeted this:

So far this season, the slotbacks have been used sparingly as ballcarriers. That wasn’t unusual in the old offense, but this isn’t the old offense. In the new offense, fullbacks are now “T-backs” and are getting the ball on option pitches in ways that used to be domain of the slotback. If the role of the fullback is expanding, does that mean the role of the slotback is shrinking?

Bill Wagner asked that very question of Grant Chesnut this week, and the answer was no. The reason why the answer is no is recruiting.

The spread option offense that Navy ran for the last 20 years has allowed the Mids to make the most of the players they had. The gold standard of spread option fullbacks was Adrian Peterson, who was listed at 5-10, 212 lbs. Navy has had success with players that size as well, like Noah Copeland and Jamale Carothers. However, they have also been successful with bigger wishbone-style fullbacks like Eric Kettani and Kyle Eckel. The coaches could recruit the best player regardless of style and still make the offense work.

Chesnut made the same argument. Maybe the ideal fullback in the new Navy offense is more like a traditional tailback, but Chesnut won’t turn away another Kettani. He won’t turn away another Reggie Campbell, either. Navy can’t afford to shrink its recruiting pool.

I’m not sure that really answers the question, though. While Navy still wants to recruit the same kinds of players, that doesn’t mean they will be used in the same ways. I could easily see a past slotback like Shun White in the new offense as a T-back. Or perhaps, with the right player, a future slotback could be used similarly to way Air Force used Chad Hall. Some may be used more as receivers. Either way, Chesnut’s goal is to make the offense fit the players he has. How those players are used remains to be seen.