It's Navy's week off, so hopefully you're spending your free time wisely. Mow your lawn or wash your car. This is the weekend your friend should have scheduled their fall wedding. As for me, I'll spend it answering your questions. So let's dive in!

Unsurprisingly, everyone wants to talk about the offense.

There is a lot of discourse suggesting the flexbone triple option is dying due to the cut blocking rule changes, which motivated Coach Monken to experiment with something different last year, and may (or may not) have been a factor in us shifting to this hybrid wing t. I’ve been skeptical of this thought since Air Force has been putting up great rushing numbers the past few years and thus far, Army looks to be in good form after going back to it. It seems like we’ve ben running quite a bit of it in the past two games as well to great success. What do you think has been different this season (as well as the past 4 for that matter)?

- Ryan F.

Before we dive in here, let's recap the problem.

There has been a gradual chipping away at cut blocking for the last 20 years. The last straw came three years ago, when all cut blocking on the perimeter was banned. Before, when a runner received an option pitch, he could turn upfield immediately, knowing the slotback in front of him put the defender on the ground. After the new rule was implemented, slotbacks couldn't do that anymore. The pitch man couldn't turn upfield and go when he got the ball. He had to read the blocks in front of him. That slowed down the play and often strung it out, allowing interior linebackers and backside secondary defenders time to run to the ball. Defenders could prioritize stopping the fullback because pitch plays would be slower to develop. How many good option pitches did we see from Navy last year? Alex Tecza had a spectacular option pitch in the first half of the Memphis game. Brandon Chatman had a 20-yard run off a double option pitch against USF. That's it.

So far, the results have been mixed for teams sticking with the option. Navy tried to run the option last year but looked terrible doing so. Air Force played well the last two seasons, although they haven't looked very good this year without their redshirts. Harding won the Division II national championship running the spread option. But other schools have dropped the offense altogether. Army was the highest-profile school last year, but they weren't alone. Kennesaw State, coached by longtime Paul Johnson assistant Brian Bohannon, has moved on, as has The Citadel.

Coaches I've talked to, both at Navy and elsewhere, insist the option is still viable even with the rule change. After switching to a new option offense this year, Army is definitely putting up better numbers. I don't usually start watching Army until later in the season, so I can't offer an opinion on what they're doing. Paul Johnson was at the Temple game last week, so there was a lot of option talk floating around the press box from people who talked to him. I heard some third-hand conversations saying that a lot of what Army is doing is going between the tackles and outside runs that aren't really option-y. I have no idea if that's accurate. Our friends over at GoBlackKnights.com may have better first-hand insight.

There's plenty to discuss when it comes to Navy, though. With 846 yards of offense through two games, the Mids definitely look improved. Still, it's too early to declare that all of Navy's triple option wounds are healed. While the Mids are 2-0, those two wins were against what will probably be the two worst teams on the schedule. Also, the Mids didn't run the triple against Bucknell other than maybe one or two plays, so we're really only looking at one game here. That's not exactly a large sample size. One might have thought the problems were solved last year after the Mids ran for 299 yards against Memphis or 331 against North Texas, but they were not. Navy's coaches also had the benefit of basically knowing what Temple's game plan would be, but we'll touch on that later.

Even with all those disclaimers, though, I don't think there's much question that Navy's offense has improved. There are a few things you can see on the field that stand out. One obvious improvement is that the offensive line is healthy, or at least they were before Trey Cummings got hurt. There were games last year where you'd cringe looking at the linemen walking back to the huddle after a play because they were limping so badly. Physically, the line is just fresher right now. It's a long season, so who knows if that will last. But it's definitely been a factor.

However, the biggest on-field improvement has been the one that directly addresses the biggest problem: perimeter blocking. Eli Heidenreich had a terrific game against Temple, but some of his best plays were when he didn't touch the ball. The tight ends also blocked well. One of the most frustrating things about Navy football last year was watching how the slotbacks didn't block. Instead of engaging with a defender, they often just stood in front of them trying to get in the way. That didn't happen against Temple. The added size that Heidenreich and the tight ends brought to the perimeter allowed them to drive defenders out of the way.

Take a look at the tight end on this play:

Look at Heidenreich and the tight end here:

This is a far cry from what we saw last year. Again, it’s a small sample size, but it seems like a significant shift to me. If the Mids can continue to get blocks like that on the perimeter, the option has a chance.

I think there are other big-picture reasons why the offense has improved, but we’ll address that in another response.

Paul Johnson said (paraphrase) - “You can do a few things really well, or you can do a lot of things poorly”. Do you think the incorporation of the Wing-T, while also keeping some flexibility to run the triple option out of the flex bone, will eventually become too much?

- Mark H

During the triple option era, it was often said that they key to success is focusing down the offense to the core and executing a large number of reps to ensure flawless execution. It was thought that diversification of the offense would undermine the quest for flawless execution of the basics because the practice reps would be spread across too many different areas. Is that whole notion different with the Wing T? Is it easier to achieve diversification combined with execution in this offense? Is it not really as diverse as it appears?

- John_A_Roush

The need for repetition is no different in the Wing-T. Both Drew Cronic and Brian Newberry have stressed the systemic nature of the offense. That is true in play calling, but it’s also true in how the team prepares. The goal of repetition is to make things as simple as possible for the offensive line. The simpler it is, the faster they react and the fewer mistakes they make.

The Wing-T achieves this through series football. A series is a group of plays designed around the same blocking assignments. In one series, you might have a sweep, a trap, a counter, an option, and multiple pass plays, all with the offensive line giving the same look. One of the key coaching points of the Wing-T is for all players, especially the quarterback, to carry out their fakes so every play looks the same. What this means for the offensive line is that when they practice one of these plays, they’re practicing all of them. What might be only three different looks for the offensive line could be three dozen plays for the offense. That helps to create the diversity you want in an offense while minimizing what the line has to practice.

A tangent to this is how the offense can look diverse even when it isn’t. That is mostly what we’ve seen this year. We’ve seen a few different formations with different motions that serve as eye candy, but the offense has only run maybe a dozen different plays so far. They look different because the setup has varied. Sometimes, it’s good enough just to simulate diversity.

As far as how the triple will fit into this in the long term, I don’t know. Right now, it might be better to ask if the Wing-T will fit into the triple because most of what we’ve seen so far has been pretty close schematically to what Navy’s been running for the last 20 years. The biggest influence of the Wing-T has been in the passing game. Is that the plan going forward, or will the offense evolve over time? I don’t know the answer to that. But at this point, I don’t think we’ve seen Navy run enough to worry about them trying to do too much.

Are the A, X, Y, positions, etc. named after the controller buttons or is there some other reason?

-djmonty93

The terminology long predates video game controllers, although it would be awesome if that were the origin.

It varies by team, but at Navy the X receiver is the split end, and the Y is the tight end. Most notable is that, unlike the old offense, the two snipes are treated as two different positions. The A is more like a traditional Navy slotback. That’s the position Chatman has been playing. The Z, which is what Heidenreich is playing, is expected to be a little bigger and a little more physical in his blocking assignments. On the message board I mentioned last week that Heidenreich is going to be a Swiss Army knife in this offense, and we’ve seen it play out through two weeks, with 174 receiving yards and three touchdowns. He’s lined up as a running back, split wide, and as an H-back/tight end. Going forward we’ll see that reflected in recruiting as well.

Do we need to get the ball to the snipes more?

-slhNavy91

I know this was a joke, but one thing about the Wing-T is that you can find natural ways to get more players the ball without having to read your way there. I was never a “get the ball to the slots more” guy— there’s something to be said for players only getting the ball when they’re supposed to— but those who made that a mantra will enjoy the offense as it evolves.

Or if it evolves…

You've really beaten the drum over the last few years that Navy is a developmental program at its best when the roster is heavy with players who have spent years coming up under the system. Given the seeming success we're seeing on offense and the fact that this is the first year of a new system, is that still true? Additionally is the apparent success/offensive turnaround primarily due to a new offensive coordinator, the new scheme, or an additional year of development for the players? Trying to understand to what degree the improvement comes from the switch at OC versus giving the players another year to grow and improve. Thanks!

-ASwoleyGhost

For the first question, yes, it’s a new system with new terminology. But in terms of what we’ve seen on the field so far, how different has the scheme been? The execution is undoubtedly better, but most of what Navy has run is the same stuff they’ve done forever: inside zone, triple option, QB sweeps, jet sweeps, etc. I’d argue that the offense has capitalized on what the team already knows. Also, Navy just played the two weakest teams on their schedule, so it’s too early to declare everything fixed, although there are definite positive indicators.

Every year, the JV team plays Myrtle Beach Collegiate. I went to the game last year, and it was a mess. Navy couldn’t sustain any drives, committed a bunch of turnovers, and lost, 30-28. It was ugly. Myrtle Beach Collegiate is one of those post-grad programs whose goal is to get players an additional season of film to attract more offers than they had in high school. It isn’t about winning. This isn’t a game the JVs should ever lose. They played again the day before the Temple game, and this time, Navy won 72-2.

Now, the JV team is just the scout team, which means they spend all week practicing another team’s stuff. When they line up to play a game like this, they rely entirely on the fundamentals they learned in spring and fall camp. You shouldn’t read much into JV game performances. Still, I think the drastic turnaround is a pretty good indication of just how improved the Mids are at the basics, which is a direct reflection on the offensive coordinator.

(NAPS is even more of a sketchy indicator since Navy doesn’t even send full teams to the prep school and isn’t coached by the Annapolis staff. The team has Coast Guard recruits and guys playing out of position. Last week, they played Nassau CC, traditionally one of the toughest games on their schedule. Nassau came into the game ranked #2 in NJCAA D-III. NAPS won, 36-0. They’re 2-0 and have outscored their opponents 71-3.)

So I think a lot of Navy’s performance on offense reflects overall fundamental improvements and just practicing better. I also think it’s worth remembering that Grant Chesnut didn’t install the same offense he ran at Kennesaw State. He put in something that was new and untested. Cronic, on the other hand, is running a system that has worked everywhere he’s been. There’s a big difference between figuring out something new as you go and running something that is proven to work, both from a coaching perspective as well as with buy-in from the players.

Your question raises others, though. Is what we’re seeing from Navy the long-term plan? Or is this just the best thing to win right away since it’s what they know? So far, we haven’t seen much of the traditional Wing-T from Navy. I don’t know if that is the plan for the future. It could be that the roster is built to run the option, and the offense will evolve as new classes of recruits are brought onboard. Or it might be that the offense we’re seeing is, in fact, the offense. There’s also a chance that Navy is just running what they think is best against the defenses they expect to see. One of the fringe benefits of playing poorly one year is that defenses are likely to line up the same way the following year. If Navy knows what other teams are going to do against the option, maybe they’re just taking advantage of that.

Regardless of what the plan is, Navy is, and will always be, a developmental program. They won’t be able to recruit the same guys FedEx pays to go to Memphis, but they can still compete against high-turnover rosters if they have a team full of guys trained to do their job over four years together.

With Trey Cummings out with an injury, the thinness at O-line has once again come to the fore. Might be a perception vs. reality thing, but I seem to recall depth charts 10 years ago that had 2-3 seniors at each O-line position. There was talk 5-7 years ago about a different recruiting profile for OL emphasizing size over athleticism (partly in response to the evolving blocking rules and offensive schemes). Did any of that have an impacting on recruiting, development, or injuries (especially at a place like the Naval Academy) that has led to the situation we’ve been in with the OL? Is there light at the end of the tunnel for getting the depth issues fixed? Seems pretty important considering our best teams were anchored by excellent and resilient OLs.

-Paddy06

This is mostly a perception vs. reality thing. There may have been a few seasons where Navy has had senior depth across the board, but that was never the norm. Out of curiosity, I looked at the preseason depth charts from 2012 and 2015, and the makeup of those lines wasn’t much different from this year’s.

However, you’re not entirely wrong. It was around 2010 where there was an emphasis on recruiting size on the offensive line. This was really only for the centers and guards. At the time, most of Navy’s opponents, most notably Air Force, were lining up in an odd front. Air Force had an all-conference nose guard, Ben Garland, that was especially hard to move. The thinking at the time was that the additional heft up the middle would match up better in those games.

However, one side effect of the change is that it affected Navy’s depth. They were never really 2-3 deep with seniors at every OL spot, but what they did do was cross-train guys to play more than one position. There were guys like Antron Harper who played across the entire line in his career. There would be a rotation of 7 guys, and if one of the subs had to come in, there was enough positional flexibility to find a spot for everyone. The two extra rotation guys were often juniors or seniors, which is probably where you got your impression. Centers and guards got bigger, but the tackles did not since they were still expected to run to the second and third level. The physical difference between positions limited Navy’s ability to cross-train between them.

You might recall one of the changes made in 2019 was to get the offensive linemen to lose weight. I don’t think that really stuck over the last few years, though. Whether there’s light at the end of the tunnel probably depends on what direction the offense goes from here. In the Wing-T, it’s the guards that do most of the running. I don’t know if the differences between the OL positions in the Wing-T would preclude cross-training, but I also don’t know if the offense is even going to evolve more toward the Wing-T. If it remains more option-focused, then building versatility would be a good way to help with depth.